ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: CHANGING LEADERSHIP ROLES?.
CHRISTENSEN, TOM
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 4/2001, pág. 457
1. Introduction. 2. Main features of reform in New Zealand and Norway. 3. Does increased horizontal specialization clarify functions and roles?. 4. Does structural devolution undermine political control?. 5. Conclusion. 6. Notes. 7. References.
THE CASE AGAINST PRIVATIZING NATIONAL SECURITY
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 4/2003, pág. 471 a 501
I. NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR. II. THE EVOLUTION AND EXTENT OF PENTAGON PRIVATIZATION. III. EXPECTED GAINS FROM PRIVATIZATION AND RECENT EVIDENCE. IV. EXAMINING THE CASE FOR FURTHER DEFENSE PRIVATIZATION. V. LESSONS FROM PRIVATIZED SCHOOLS, PRISONS, AND PUBLIC SERVICES. VI. CONCLUSION.
BRUSIS, MARTIN
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 4/2002, pág. 531
1. Introduction. 2. Implications of Europeanization debate. 3. Differences and similarities in mesolevel reforms across accession countries. 4. Towards an explanation of reform paths and outcomes. 5. Conclusion.
BRUSSELS BETWEEN BERN AND BERLIN: COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM MEETS THE EUROPEAN UNION
A. BÖRZEL AND O. HOSLI, MADELEINE
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 2/2003, pág. 179 a 196
1. INTRODUCTION 2. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM: COMBINING TWO APPROACHES 3. MOVING TOWARD A FEDERAL STRUCTURE: CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 4. BRUSSELS BETWEEN BERN AND BERLIN 5. CONCLUSIONES
BUSINESS MODELS AND THE TRANSFER OF BUSINESSLIKE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
JAMES, OLIVER
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 2/2001, pág. 233
I. Section one: the business-like agency model. II. Section two: International transfer by emulation of the UK agency model. III. Section three: corporate governance and the agency model. IV. Conclusion.
HUTCHCROFT, PAUL D.
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 1/2001, pág. 23
1. Explaining(and bridging) the administrative-political divide. 2. Centralization and decentralization in administration. 3. Centralization and decentralization in politics. 4. Analyzing (and integrating) the administrative and the political. 5. Deciphering decentralization. 6. Conclusion. 7. Notes.
SBRAGIA, ALBERTA M.
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 3/2002, pág. 393 a 411
I. INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE. II. "INTERGOVERNMENTALISM" VERSUS "SUPRANATIONALITY". III. INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCES. IV. THE TREATY OF NICE. V. THE FLUIDITY OF INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE. VI. CONCLUSIONS.
CORPORATISM, PLURALISM, AND DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A DELIBERATIVE THEORY OF BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
HUNOLD, CHRISTIAN
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 2/2001, pág. 151
I. Deliberative democracy. Objection 1: Deliberative Democracy Requires Consensus. Objection 2: Deliberative Democracy Is Inefficient. Objection 3: Deliberative Democracy Cannot Accommodate Interests. II. Controlling administrative power through public deliberation. 1. Publicity. 2. Equality. 3. Inclusiveness. III. Corporatism, pluralism,...
I. Deliberative democracy. Objection 1: Deliberative Democracy Requires Consensus. Objection 2: Deliberative Democracy Is Inefficient. Objection 3: Deliberative Democracy Cannot Accommodate Interests. II. Controlling administrative power through public deliberation. 1. Publicity. 2. Equality. 3. Inclusiveness. III. Corporatism, pluralism, and administrative accountability. IV. Conclusion.
BEZES, PHILIPPE
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 1/2001, pág. 99
1. The hypothesis of a two-level game as a basis for a power-reform dilemma: propositions for studying administrative reforms. 2. Rocard and the corporatist structuring of administrative reform(1988-1991): between new public management and the defensive game. a) The Public Service Renewal(PSR): The Epitome of the "Orthodox-Innovator"?....
1. The hypothesis of a two-level game as a basis for a power-reform dilemma: propositions for studying administrative reforms. 2. Rocard and the corporatist structuring of administrative reform(1988-1991): between new public management and the defensive game. a) The Public Service Renewal(PSR): The Epitome of the "Orthodox-Innovator"?. b) The Structure of Rocars Leadership within the French Pattern: Defensive Project as a Strategic Behavior for Leadership in Administration. 3. Juppe state reform and the ambiguity of reshaping the french state offensively(1995-1997). a) Playing the External Game for Reshaping the French State: The "Politics of Preemption". b) The Dynamics of Defeat: The Impediments to Order-Shattering Efforts within the French Political Power Configuration. 4. Structures and reform: institutional evidence for the success of a "conservative leadership" in france. a) The Saliency of the Bureaucratic Legitimation. b) The Conservative Dimension of Constitutional Resources. c) The Weak Differentiation of the Political Leadership within the French Administrative System. 5. Conclusion. 6. Notes. 7. References.
DELIBERATION, LEGITIMACY, AND MULTILATERAL DEMOCRACY.
LOREN A. KING.
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 1/2003, pág. 23 a 50
I. INTRODUCTION. II. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE SOVEREIGN STATE. III. WHY DELIBERATION?. IV. LEGITIMACY, REASONS, AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS. V.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS.
ARCHON FUNG.
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 1/2003, pág. 51 a 71
I.TWO DELIBERATIVE-DEMOCRATIC APPROACHES. II. THE CASE FOR INCLUSIVE AND CONTINMUOUS DELIBERATIVE ENGAGEMENT. III. DELIBERATIVE INSTITUTIONS: CREATING SPACE FOR PUBLICS. IV. OBSTACLES TO DECENTRALIZED DELIBERATION. V. ACKNOWLEDGEMTS. VI. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
DEMOCRATIZING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
STIGLITZ, JOSEPH E.
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 1/2003, pág. 111 a 140
1. ACCOUNTABILITY: A DEFINITION AND ILLUSTRATION. 2. GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABLE TO WHOM? 3. REFORMING THE WORLD BANK. A)NEW THINKING ABOUT DEVELOPMENT. B)THINKING ABOUT AID AND THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK. C)INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE WORLD BANK AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. D)REDEFINING THE MANDATE. 4. AN AGENDA FOR REFORM OF THE IMF. A) ABOLISHING...
1. ACCOUNTABILITY: A DEFINITION AND ILLUSTRATION. 2. GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABLE TO WHOM? 3. REFORMING THE WORLD BANK. A)NEW THINKING ABOUT DEVELOPMENT. B)THINKING ABOUT AID AND THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK. C)INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE WORLD BANK AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. D)REDEFINING THE MANDATE. 4. AN AGENDA FOR REFORM OF THE IMF. A) ABOLISHING THE IMF. B) LENDER OF LAST RESORT. C) INCREASING THE IMF'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND EXPANDING ITS RESOURCE BASIS. 5. MY PROPOSED REFORMS. A) FOCUS ON CRISIS. B) CHANGING MODES OF OPERATION. C) REFORMED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE. D) INCREASED OPENNESS. 6. CONCLUSION. 7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
DISMANTLING SWEDISH HOUSING POLICY.
LINDBOM, ANDERS
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 4/2001, pág. 503
1. Introduction. 2. Has housing policy been dismantled?. 3. Why has retrenchment been possible?. 4. Citizens'knowledge of welfare policy. 5. Concluding discussion. 6. Notes. 7. References.
DOES ADMINISTRATIVE CORPORATISM PROMOTE TRUST AND DELIBERATION?
OBERG, PEROLA
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 4/2002, pág. 455
1. Administrative corporatism. 2. Trust and deliberation: arguments for administrative corporatism. 3. A case of corporatist organization of public administration. 4. Trust. 5. Public interest. 6. Conclusions.
ENHANCING WTO LEGITIMACY: CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OR GLOBAL SUBSIDIARITY?.
ROBERT HOWSE; KALYPSO NICOLAIDIS.
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 1/2003, pág. 73 a 94
I INTRODUCTION. II. FROM INTERSTATE BARGAINING TO CONSTITUTIONALISM: EMBEDDED LIBERALISM IN DISREPAIR. III. RESPONSES TO THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS: THE FALLACY OF CONSTITUTIONALISM. IV. NONCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS OF STRENGTHENING THE WTO: A MODEL OF GLOBAL SUBSIDIARITY. V. CONCLUSION. VI. ACKNOELEDGMENTS.
MARES, ISABELA
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 3/2001, pág. 295
1. Early retirement in France and Germany: an overview. 2. The development of early retirement in France. 3. The state against large firms: the development of early retirement in Germany. 4. Conclusions. 5. Notes. 6. References.
COHEN, EDWARD S.
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 1/2001, pág. 75
1. The state and its boundaries. 2. Globalization and the state. 3. International migration and the boundaries of the state. a) Migration and Globalization. b) Migration and the Politics of Sovereignty. c) Globalization, Sovereignty, and Immigration. 4. Conclusions. 5. Notes. 6. References.
GLOBALIZATION, EUROPEANIZATION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE FUTURE OF SCANDINAVIAN EXCEPTIONALISM.
ROBERT R. GEYER
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 4/2003, pág. 559 a 576
I. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE GROWTH OF THEORETICAL DIVERSITY AND RECOGNITION OF COMPLEXITY. II. THE SHORT RISE AND FALL OF "HARD" GLOBALIZATION. III. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY: FROM SIMPLE TO COMPLEX INTERACTION. IV. EUROPEANIZATION: THE BABY BROTHER OF GLOBALIZATION. V. THE HISTORY OF THE END OF SCANDINAVIAN EXCEPTIONALISM....
I. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE GROWTH OF THEORETICAL DIVERSITY AND RECOGNITION OF COMPLEXITY. II. THE SHORT RISE AND FALL OF "HARD" GLOBALIZATION. III. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY: FROM SIMPLE TO COMPLEX INTERACTION. IV. EUROPEANIZATION: THE BABY BROTHER OF GLOBALIZATION. V. THE HISTORY OF THE END OF SCANDINAVIAN EXCEPTIONALISM. VI. NEXT STEPS. ...
GLOBALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, AND THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF PUBLIC POLICY REFORM IN EAST ASIA.
BEESON, MARK
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 4/2001, pág. 481
1. Globalization and governance. a) Globalization. b) Governance. c) Global Governance. d) Contingent Governance. 2. Governance in east asia. a) The East Asian Developmental State. b) Political Obstacles to Reform in East Asia. c) The Persistence of Difference. 3. Concluding remarks. 4. Notes. 5. References.
MCCALL, CATHAL;WILLIAMSON, ARTHUR
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 3/2001, pág. 363
1. Introduction. 2. The changing shape of democracy. a) The Representative and the Active Citizen. b) Globalization/Localization and Cosmopolitan Democracy. c) Participation an Deliberation. d) Participation and Lethargy. 3. Governance and participative democracy in northern Ireland. a) Some Caveats to Participation. b) The Civic Forum...
1. Introduction. 2. The changing shape of democracy. a) The Representative and the Active Citizen. b) Globalization/Localization and Cosmopolitan Democracy. c) Participation an Deliberation. d) Participation and Lethargy. 3. Governance and participative democracy in northern Ireland. a) Some Caveats to Participation. b) The Civic Forum as a Participative Institution. c) Political Perceptions of Participative Democracy and the Civic Forum. d) The Inclusiveness of a Northern Ireland Civic Forum. 4. Conclusion. 5. Notes. 6. References.
HARRISON, KATHRYN
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 1/2002, pág. 65
1. Introduction. 2. Theoretical framework. 3. Effluent standards for the pulp and paper industry. 4. Comparison of regulatory standards. 5. Evolving causal knowledge. 6. Competing interest. 7. Institutional context. 8. Conclusions.
IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND INSTITUTIONS: CHALLENGING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS PARADIGM IN BOTSWANA.
AMY R. POTEETE
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 4/2003, pág. 527 a 557
I. AN EMPRIRICAL PUZZLE: POLICIES FOR RANGE MANAGEMENT IN BOTSWANA. II. IDEAS, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS. III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND AND LIVESTOCK IN BOTSWANA. IV. CHALLENGING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS PARADIGM. V. CONCLUSIONS. VI.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
IMPLEMENTATION FROM ABOVE: THE ECOLOGY OF POWER IN SWEDEN'S ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE.
LUNDQVIST, LENNART J.
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 3/2001, pág. 319
1. From governing to governance: changing ecology of power?. 2. A major shift in environmental policy: sweden opts for ecological modernization. a) Governance and Ecological Modernization: New Structures and Processes. b) Governing without Bureaucracy? Intergovernmental Management at the Central and Regional Levels. c) Governance between...
1. From governing to governance: changing ecology of power?. 2. A major shift in environmental policy: sweden opts for ecological modernization. a) Governance and Ecological Modernization: New Structures and Processes. b) Governing without Bureaucracy? Intergovernmental Management at the Central and Regional Levels. c) Governance between Game and Trust: The Management of Central-Local Relations. d) Governing without the People? Local Management of the LIP Process. 3. The ecology of governance:central government, steering and intergovernmental dependence. 4. Notes. 5. References.
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND POLICY TRANSFER: REFORMING BRITISH AND GERMAN RAILWAY REGULATION
LODGE, MARTIN
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 2/2003, pág. 159 a 174
1. AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO POLICY TRANSFER 2. REGULATORY CHANGE IN RAILWAYS IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY 3. CONCLUSION
CRAM, LAURA
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION AND , n.º 3/2002, pág. 309 a 324
I. INTRODUCTION. II. FROM CENTRALIZATION TO FRAGMENTATION. III. NEW POLICY TECHNOLOGIES: THE DEMISE OF THE COMMUNITY METHOD. IV. ACCOUNTABILITY, CREDIBILITY, AND TRUST. V. THE RISE OF NEW ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS. VI. PREPARING TO FIGHT THE RIGHT WAR. VII. CONCLUSION: AVOIDING THE TRAP OF THE "NIRVANA FALLACY".