I. Deliberative democracy. Objection 1: Deliberative Democracy Requires Consensus. Objection 2: Deliberative Democracy Is Inefficient. Objection 3: Deliberative Democracy Cannot Accommodate Interests. II. Controlling administrative power through public deliberation. 1. Publicity. 2. Equality. 3. Inclusiveness. III. Corporatism, pluralism,...

I. Deliberative democracy. Objection 1: Deliberative Democracy Requires Consensus. Objection 2: Deliberative Democracy Is Inefficient. Objection 3: Deliberative Democracy Cannot Accommodate Interests. II. Controlling administrative power through public deliberation. 1. Publicity. 2. Equality. 3. Inclusiveness. III. Corporatism, pluralism, and administrative accountability. IV. Conclusion.

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1. The hypothesis of a two-level game as a basis for a power-reform dilemma: propositions for studying administrative reforms. 2. Rocard and the corporatist structuring of administrative reform(1988-1991): between new public management and the defensive game. a) The Public Service Renewal(PSR): The Epitome of the "Orthodox-Innovator"?....

1. The hypothesis of a two-level game as a basis for a power-reform dilemma: propositions for studying administrative reforms. 2. Rocard and the corporatist structuring of administrative reform(1988-1991): between new public management and the defensive game. a) The Public Service Renewal(PSR): The Epitome of the "Orthodox-Innovator"?. b) The Structure of Rocars Leadership within the French Pattern: Defensive Project as a Strategic Behavior for Leadership in Administration. 3. Juppe state reform and the ambiguity of reshaping the french state offensively(1995-1997). a) Playing the External Game for Reshaping the French State: The "Politics of Preemption". b) The Dynamics of Defeat: The Impediments to Order-Shattering Efforts within the French Political Power Configuration. 4. Structures and reform: institutional evidence for the success of a "conservative leadership" in france. a) The Saliency of the Bureaucratic Legitimation. b) The Conservative Dimension of Constitutional Resources. c) The Weak Differentiation of the Political Leadership within the French Administrative System. 5. Conclusion. 6. Notes. 7. References.

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1. ACCOUNTABILITY: A DEFINITION AND ILLUSTRATION. 2. GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABLE TO WHOM? 3. REFORMING THE WORLD BANK. A)NEW THINKING ABOUT DEVELOPMENT. B)THINKING ABOUT AID AND THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK. C)INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE WORLD BANK AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. D)REDEFINING THE MANDATE. 4. AN AGENDA FOR REFORM OF THE IMF. A) ABOLISHING...

1. ACCOUNTABILITY: A DEFINITION AND ILLUSTRATION. 2. GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABLE TO WHOM? 3. REFORMING THE WORLD BANK. A)NEW THINKING ABOUT DEVELOPMENT. B)THINKING ABOUT AID AND THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK. C)INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE WORLD BANK AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. D)REDEFINING THE MANDATE. 4. AN AGENDA FOR REFORM OF THE IMF. A) ABOLISHING THE IMF. B) LENDER OF LAST RESORT. C) INCREASING THE IMF'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND EXPANDING ITS RESOURCE BASIS. 5. MY PROPOSED REFORMS. A) FOCUS ON CRISIS. B) CHANGING MODES OF OPERATION. C) REFORMED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE. D) INCREASED OPENNESS. 6. CONCLUSION. 7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

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I. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE GROWTH OF THEORETICAL DIVERSITY AND RECOGNITION OF COMPLEXITY. II. THE SHORT RISE AND FALL OF "HARD" GLOBALIZATION. III. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY: FROM SIMPLE TO COMPLEX INTERACTION. IV. EUROPEANIZATION: THE BABY BROTHER OF GLOBALIZATION. V. THE HISTORY OF THE END OF SCANDINAVIAN EXCEPTIONALISM....

I. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE GROWTH OF THEORETICAL DIVERSITY AND RECOGNITION OF COMPLEXITY. II. THE SHORT RISE AND FALL OF "HARD" GLOBALIZATION. III. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY: FROM SIMPLE TO COMPLEX INTERACTION. IV. EUROPEANIZATION: THE BABY BROTHER OF GLOBALIZATION. V. THE HISTORY OF THE END OF SCANDINAVIAN EXCEPTIONALISM. VI. NEXT STEPS. ...

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1. Introduction. 2. The changing shape of democracy. a) The Representative and the Active Citizen. b) Globalization/Localization and Cosmopolitan Democracy. c) Participation an Deliberation. d) Participation and Lethargy. 3. Governance and participative democracy in northern Ireland. a) Some Caveats to Participation. b) The Civic Forum...

1. Introduction. 2. The changing shape of democracy. a) The Representative and the Active Citizen. b) Globalization/Localization and Cosmopolitan Democracy. c) Participation an Deliberation. d) Participation and Lethargy. 3. Governance and participative democracy in northern Ireland. a) Some Caveats to Participation. b) The Civic Forum as a Participative Institution. c) Political Perceptions of Participative Democracy and the Civic Forum. d) The Inclusiveness of a Northern Ireland Civic Forum. 4. Conclusion. 5. Notes. 6. References.

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1. From governing to governance: changing ecology of power?. 2. A major shift in environmental policy: sweden opts for ecological modernization. a) Governance and Ecological Modernization: New Structures and Processes. b) Governing without Bureaucracy? Intergovernmental Management at the Central and Regional Levels. c) Governance between...

1. From governing to governance: changing ecology of power?. 2. A major shift in environmental policy: sweden opts for ecological modernization. a) Governance and Ecological Modernization: New Structures and Processes. b) Governing without Bureaucracy? Intergovernmental Management at the Central and Regional Levels. c) Governance between Game and Trust: The Management of Central-Local Relations. d) Governing without the People? Local Management of the LIP Process. 3. The ecology of governance:central government, steering and intergovernmental dependence. 4. Notes. 5. References.

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