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ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: CHANGING LEADERSHIP ROLES?.

CHRISTENSEN, TOM

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 4/2001, pág. 457

1. Introduction. 2. Main features of reform in New Zealand and Norway. 3. Does increased horizontal specialization clarify functions and roles?. 4. Does structural devolution undermine political control?. 5. Conclusion. 6. Notes. 7. References.

ANN R. MARKUSEN.

THE CASE AGAINST PRIVATIZING NATIONAL SECURITY

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 4/2003, pág. 471 a 501

Sumario

I. NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR. II. THE EVOLUTION AND EXTENT OF PENTAGON PRIVATIZATION. III. EXPECTED GAINS FROM PRIVATIZATION AND RECENT EVIDENCE. IV. EXAMINING THE CASE FOR FURTHER DEFENSE PRIVATIZATION. V. LESSONS FROM PRIVATIZED SCHOOLS, PRISONS, AND PUBLIC SERVICES. VI. CONCLUSION.

BETWEEN EU REQUIREMENTS, COMPETITIVE POLITICS, AND NATIONAL TRADITIONS: RE-CREATING REGIONS IN THE ACCESSION COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

BRUSIS, MARTIN

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 4/2002, pág. 531

Sumario

1. Introduction. 2. Implications of Europeanization debate. 3. Differences and similarities in mesolevel reforms across accession countries. 4. Towards an explanation of reform paths and outcomes. 5. Conclusion.

BRUSSELS BETWEEN BERN AND BERLIN: COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM MEETS THE EUROPEAN UNION

A. BÖRZEL AND O. HOSLI, MADELEINE

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 2/2003, pág. 179 a 196

Sumario

1. INTRODUCTION 2. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM: COMBINING TWO APPROACHES 3. MOVING TOWARD A FEDERAL STRUCTURE: CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 4. BRUSSELS BETWEEN BERN AND BERLIN 5. CONCLUSIONES

BUSINESS MODELS AND THE TRANSFER OF BUSINESSLIKE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

JAMES, OLIVER

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 2/2001, pág. 233

Sumario

I. Section one: the business-like agency model. II. Section two: International transfer by emulation of the UK agency model. III. Section three: corporate governance and the agency model. IV. Conclusion.

CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION IN ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS: ASSESSING TERRITORIAL DIMENSIONS OF AUTHORITY AND POWER.

HUTCHCROFT, PAUL D.

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 1/2001, pág. 23

Sumario

1. Explaining(and bridging) the administrative-political divide. 2. Centralization and decentralization in administration. 3. Centralization and decentralization in politics. 4. Analyzing (and integrating) the administrative and the political. 5. Deciphering decentralization. 6. Conclusion. 7. Notes.

CONCLUSION TO SPECIAL ISSUE ON THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE AND THE FUTURE OF EU GOVERNANCE: THE TREATY OF NICE, INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE, AND UNCERTAINTY

SBRAGIA, ALBERTA M.

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 3/2002, pág. 393 a 411

Sumario

I. INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE. II. "INTERGOVERNMENTALISM" VERSUS "SUPRANATIONALITY". III. INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCES. IV. THE TREATY OF NICE. V. THE FLUIDITY OF INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE. VI. CONCLUSIONS.

CORPORATISM, PLURALISM, AND DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A DELIBERATIVE THEORY OF BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

HUNOLD, CHRISTIAN

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 2/2001, pág. 151

Sumario

I. Deliberative democracy. Objection 1: Deliberative Democracy Requires Consensus. Objection 2: Deliberative Democracy Is Inefficient. Objection 3: Deliberative Democracy Cannot Accommodate Interests. II. Controlling administrative power through public deliberation. 1. Publicity. 2. Equality. 3. Inclusiveness. III. Corporatism, pluralism, and administrative accountability. IV. Conclusion.

COUNTRY REPORT: FRANCE. DEFENSIVE VERSUS OFFENSIVE APPROACHES TO ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN FRANCE(1988-1997): THE LEADERSHIP DILEMMAS OF FRENCH PRIME MINISTERS.

BEZES, PHILIPPE

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 1/2001, pág. 99

Sumario

1. The hypothesis of a two-level game as a basis for a power-reform dilemma: propositions for studying administrative reforms. 2. Rocard and the corporatist structuring of administrative reform(1988-1991): between new public management and the defensive game. a) The Public Service Renewal(PSR): The Epitome of the "Orthodox-Innovator"?. b) The Structure of Rocars Leadership within the French Pattern: Defensive Project as a Strategic Behavior for Leadership in Administration. 3. Juppe state reform and the ambiguity of reshaping the french state offensively(1995-1997). a) Playing the External Game for Reshaping the French State: The "Politics of Preemption". b) The Dynamics of Defeat: The Impediments to Order-Shattering Efforts within the French Political Power Configuration. 4. Structures and reform: institutional evidence for the success of a "conservative leadership" in france. a) The Saliency of the Bureaucratic Legitimation. b) The Conservative Dimension of Constitutional Resources. c) The Weak Differentiation of the Political Leadership within the French Administrative System. 5. Conclusion. 6. Notes. 7. References.

DELIBERATION, LEGITIMACY, AND MULTILATERAL DEMOCRACY.

LOREN A. KING.

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 1/2003, pág. 23 a 50

Sumario

I. INTRODUCTION. II. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE SOVEREIGN STATE. III. WHY DELIBERATION?. IV. LEGITIMACY, REASONS, AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS. V.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

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