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Centro de Estudios Municipales y de Cooperación Internacional (CEMCI)

CORRUPTION, REFORM, AND VIRTUE ETHICS

LYNCH, THOMAS D.; LYNCH, CYNTHIA E.

Public Administration Review, n.º 3/2003, pág. 370 a 374

Sumario
1. CORRUPTION 2. CORRUPTION: AN ECONOMIST'S VIEW 3. LEGAL CORRUPTION 4. THE VIRTUE ETHICS SOLUTION 5. CONCLUSION

COUNTY SERVICE DELIVERY: DOES GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE MATTER?

BENTON, J. EDWIN

Public Administration Review, n.º 4/2002, pág. 471

Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. Previous Research. 3. Local Government Reform: Rationale and Purposes. 4. County Government Structure and Spending: A Test of Basic Assumptions. 5. Implications and Conclusions.

CRACKED CEILINGS, FIRMER FLOORS, AND WEAKENING WALLS: TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN GENDER REPRESENTATION AMONG EXECUTIVES LEADING AMERICAN STATE AGENCIES, 1970-2000

BOWLING, CYNTHIA J.; KELLEHER, CHRISTINE A.; JONES, JENNIFER; WRIGHT, DEIL S.

Public Administration Review, n.º 6/2006, pág. 823 a 836

Sumario
1. DATA SETS, GENDER FOCUS, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS. 2. ENHANCED GENDER OPPORTUNITIES: THE GROWTH OF STATE AGENCIES. 3. PASSIVE REPRESENTATIVENESS: ATTRIBUTES OF STATE AGENCY HEADS. 4. TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF ACTIVE REPRESENTATION. 5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

CREDIBLE COMMITMENT AND COUNCIL-MANAGER GOVERNMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY INSTRUMENT CHOICES

FEIOCHK, RICHARD C.; JEONG, MOON-GI; STIEFEL, LEANNA

Public Administration Review, n.º 5/2003, pág. 616

Sumario
I. THE TRANSACTION COST OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE. II. THE ROOTS OF MUNICIPAL REFORM. III. OPPORTUNISM AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. IV. THE MEDIATING ROLE OF GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS. V. INSTRUMENT CHOICE AND HIGH-POWER INCENTIVES. VI. ANALYSIS. VII. DISCUSSION.

CROSS PRESSURES OF ACCOUNTABILITY: INITIATIVE, COMMAND AND FAILURE IN THE RON BROWN PLANE CRASH

ROMZEK, BARBARA S.;WALLACE INGRAHAM, PATRICIA

Public Administration Review, n.º 3/2000, pág. 240

Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. Accountability in the publicsector. 2. Accountability in the Military. 3. The mishapflight. 4. Air force accountability reactions to the misapflight. 5. Conclusion.

CROSS PRESSURES OF ACCOUNTABILITY: INITIATIVE, COMMAND, AND FAILURE IN THE RON BROWN PLANE CRASH

ROMZEK, BARBARA S.;WALLACE INGRAHAM, PATRICIA

Public Administration Review, n.º 3/2000, pág. 240

Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. Accountability in the PublicSector. a) Challenges of Accountability. 3. Accountabilityin the Military. a) The Institutional Context of the UnitedStates Air Force. b) Air Force Accountability Under NormalCircumstances. c) The Managerial Cross Pressures FacingAirlift Wing Commanders. 4. The Mishap Flight. 5. Air ForceAccountability Reactions to the Mishap Flight. a)Accountability to Sources External to the Air Force. b)Accountability to Sources Internal to the Air Force. c)Summary. 6. Conclusion.

DEALING WITH THEM: PREPARING STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS FOR THE CROSS-CULTURAL CHALLENGE

LINCOLN CHADWIN, MARK;ROGERS, SANDRA E.;SUK KIM, PAN

Public Administration Review, n.º 6/1995, pág. 517

Sumario
1. Training Methods and Rigor. 2. Possible Applications. a) State and Local Government Applications. 3. Senior Officials. 4. Summary.

DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC INSTABILITY: THE CASE OF COSTA RICA

RYAN, JEFFREY J.

Public Administration Review, n.º 1/2004, pág. 81

Sumario
1. DECENTRALIZATION IN COSTA RICA. 2. CURRENT CONDITIONS: CONTEXT AS PREDICTOR. 3. POTENTIAL FOR NEGATIVE SIDE EFFECTS. 4. CONCLUSION.

DECISIVE DECISION MAKING IN THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROCESS: ANALYZING THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROPENSITIES OF CENTRAL BUDGET BUREAU ANALYSTS

THURMAIER, KURT

Public Administration Review, n.º 5/1995, pág. 448

Sumario
1. Evidence is mounting that CBBs (including OMB) play critical policy-making roles beyond their tradicional gatekeeper functions. 2. The modest literature on budgeteers suggests that a micro-budgeting theory cannot rely on an exclusive definition of nationality but must integrate political and economic rationalities (and perhaps others)...

DEFENSE CONTINGENCY BUDGETING IN THE POST-COLD-WAR WORLD

BANKS, WILLIAM C.;STRAUSSMAN, JEFFREY D.

Public Administration Review, n.º 2/1999, pág. 135

Sumario
1. The new public management and "missionbudgeting" in defense. 2. Financing U.S. militaryinvolvement in Bosnia: A case study of ex post budgeting.3. Where to find the money?. 4. From IFOR to thestabilization force. 5. The consequences of the currentsystem for funding peace operation and selected proposalsfor reform. 6. A second look at mission budgeting: is itworkable for defense?. 7. An overseas contingency operationsfiscal authorization act. 8. An expanded overseascontingency operations transfer fund. 9. Conclusion.

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