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Centro de Estudios Municipales y de Cooperación Internacional (CEMCI)

THE AUDITING OF PUBLIC POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF AUDITING: THE U.S. GAO AND ISRAEL STATE COMPTROLLER

G. GRASSO, PATRICK;SHARKANSKY, IRA

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 1/2001, pág. 1

Sumario
1. The importance of auditor independence. 2. On the nature of auditing, policy, and politics. 3. Public policy, political audits, and response. a) Institutional Independence. b) Process Independence, Politically Driven Audits, and the Perception of Audit Independence. c) Political Claims about the Auditor "Mandate". Auditing and Party Politics. 4. The auditor politicized. 5. Politicization and institutional independence. 6. Implications. 7. Notes. 8. References.

THE END OF THE LINE? ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF NETWORKS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND JOINED-UP SERVICES

CONSIDINE, MARK

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 1/2002, pág. 21

Sumario
1. Research strategy. 2. Vertical accountability. 3. Horizontal accountability. 4. Process-centered accountability. 5. Reflexive accountability: the case of employment service reform. 6. Estimating accountability. 7. Discussion.

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: THE LIMITS OF CENTRALIZATION AND THE PERILS OF PARLIAMENTARIZATION

MAJONE, GIANDOMENICO

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 3/2002, pág. 375 a 392

Sumario
I. THE MYTH OF CENTRALIZATION. II. FROM TOTAL HARMONIZATION TO NO HARMONIZATION. III. THE QUESTION OF "CREEPING COMPETENCES". IV. THE PARLIAMENTARIZATION OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS POLICY CONSEQUENCES. V. AN INDEPENDENT FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE EU. VI. THE COMMISSION IN THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COMMISSION CRISIS: A NEW ASSERTIVENESS?

JUDGE, DAVID; EARNSHAW, DAVID

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 3/2002, pág. 345 a 374

Sumario
I. THE "PARLIAMENTARIAN MODEL". II. NEGATIVE POWERS. III. REFUSAL TO DISCHARGE BUDGET. IV. COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS. V. APPOINTMENT OF A NEW COMMISSION: PUTTING HUMPTY BACK TOGETHER. VI. THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE SELECTION. VII. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND CHOICE OF COMMISSION. VIII. THE RISE OF PARTY POLITICS. IX. FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT: "WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY" (PRODI TO PARLIAMENT). X. BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT. XI. CONCLUSION.

TUTORS AND PUPILS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, CENTRAL EUROPEAN ELITES, AND WESTERN MODELS

JACOBY, WADE

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 2/2001, pág. 169

Sumario
I. Western answer syndrome. II. The political functions of imitating foreign models. III. Templates, thresholds, and adjustments: three ways of using western models. IV. Conclusion: with every blessing there comes a curse.

UNDERSTANDING NHS REFORM: THE POLICY-TRANSFER, SOCIAL LEARNING, AND PATH-DEPENDENCY PERSPECTIVES

GREENER, IAN

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 2/2002, pág. 161

Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. Approaches. 3. Approaches and Reforms. 4. Discussion. 5. Conclusion.

WHY DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? AN AUDIENCE-COST THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT.

SUSANNE LOHMANN.

Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, n.º 1/2003, pág. 95 a 110

Sumario
I. INTRODUCTION. II. CREDIBILITY VERSUS FLEXIBILITY. III. AUDIENCE COST. IV. EXCUSED DEFECTION, ACCOMMODATION, AND SOLLBRUCHSTELLE. V. INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY. VI. CONCLUSION.

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