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Centro de Estudios Municipales y de Cooperación Internacional (CEMCI)

TAKING BEHAVIORALISM SERIOUSLY: SOME EVIDENCE OF MARKET MANIPULATION

HANSON, JON D.;KYSAR, DOUGLAS A.

Harvard Law Review, n.º 7/1999, pág. 1420

Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. Some modest market evidence ofconsumer manipulation. 3. A case study in manufacturermanipulation: the Tobbaco Industry. a) A Sample of IndustryConduct. b) Reassessing the Debate over Smoker RiskPerceptions. c) Some Thoughts on Competition and MarketPower. 4. A potential response to market manipulation:enterprise liability. a) Taking Enterprise LiabilitySeriously. b) The First Generation of Products LiabilityScholars Revived. 5. Conclusion.

TAX LAW - ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX - SEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT CONTINGENT ATTORNEYS' FEES MUST BE INCLUDED IN A TAXPAYER'S GROSS INCOME.- KENSETH V. COMMISSIONER, 259 F.3D 881 (7 TH CIR. 2001)

Harvard Law Review, n.º 8/2002, pág. 2357

TAXING SUNNY DAYS: ADJUSTING TAXES FOR REGIONAL LIVING COST AND AMENITIES.

KNOLL, MICHAEL S.;GRIFFITH THOMAS D.

Harvard Law Review, n.º 4/2003, pág. 987 a 1025

Sumario
1. DIFFERENCES IN LIVING COSTS AND PRODUCTIVITY ACROSS REGIONS 2. THE NO-TAX BENCHMARK 3. THE IMPACT OF TAXES INTERREGIONAL ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES 4. HOW THE INCOME TAX MISALLOCATES RESOURCES 5. ADJUSTING TAXES TO REFLECT DIFFERENCES IN REGIONALN LIVING COSTS 6. EARNED INCOME AND CAPITAL 7. CONSUMPTION AMENITIES 8. SHOULD TAXES BE ADJUSTED FOR DIFFERENCES IN LIVING COSTS AND AMENITIES? 9. CONCLUSION

TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AND THE IMBALANCE OF POWER

Harvard Law Review, n.º 7/1996, pág. 1647

THE AESTHETICS OF AMERICAN LAW

SCHLAG, PIERRE

Harvard Law Review, n.º 4/2002, pág. 1047

Sumario
I. The aesthetic of the grid. II. The energy aesthetic. III. Perspectivism. IV. The dissociative aesthetic. V. Aesthetics at work. VI. The contest of aesthetics. VII. So what? how it matters. VIII. Conclusion.

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: GREAT PROGRESS, GREATER POTENTIAL

Harvard Law Review, n.º 7/1996, pág. 1602

THE AVOIDANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS AND THE PRESERVATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: FEDERAL COURT TREATMENT OF THE NEW HABEAS PROVISIONS

Harvard Law Review, n.º 6/1998, pág. 1578

Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. The AEDPA's new limits on the writ of habeas corpus. 3. leading cases interpreting the AEDPA. 4. The Intersection of canons of statutory interpretation. a) Avoiding constitutional questions. b) The constitution and the AEDPA`S Provisions. c) The presumption in favor of federal court judicial review. 5. Conclusion.

THE CANONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

BALKIN, J.M.;LEVINSON, SANFORD

Harvard Law Review, n.º 4/1998, pág. 964

Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. The different meanings of canonicity. a) Pedagogy, cultural literacy, and academic theory. b) Audience and function. c) Canons legal and literary. d) Deep canonicity. e) Prescriptive and sociological approaches. f) Institutional contexts and strange bedfellows. 3. Constitutional canons and constitutional thought. a) Comparativism and court-centeredness. b) Practice concerns and "Timeless Problems". c) Pedagogy and academic theory. d) Expanding the Canon. e) The symbiosis of theories and canons. 4. Conclusion.

THE CASE FOR FEDERAL THREATS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Harvard Law Review, n.º 8/2005, pág. 2726

Sumario
I. THE FEDERALISM DEBATE IN CORPORATE LAW. II. REEVALUATING EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE RACE IN LIGHT OF THE FEDERAL INFLUENCE. III. THE DRAWBACKS OF DIRECT FEDERAL CORPORATE LAWMAKING. IV. THE CASE FOR FEDERAL THREATS. V. CONCLUSION.

THE CASE FOR INCREASING SHAREHOLDER POWER

BEBCHUK, LUCIAN ARYE

Harvard Law Review, n.º 3/2005, pág. 833 a 914

Sumario
1. INTRODUCTION: RECONSIDERING THE ALLOCATION OF POWER BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND SHAREHOLDERS. 2. THE EXISTING ALLOCATION OF POWER. A) U.S. LAW. B) THE DIFFERENT APPROACH OF UNITED KINGDOM. 3. LETTING SHAREHOLDERS SET RULES. A) THE LIMITS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER TO REPLACE DIRECTORS. B) SHAREHOLDERS' VETO POWER OVER FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES. C) THE BENEFITS OF LETTING SHAREHOLDERS SET THE RULES. D) DESIGN. 4. OBJECTIONS TO LETTING SHAREHOLDERS SET THE RULES. A) RARE ADOPTION OF SHAREHOLDER-INITIATED CHANGES. B) THE COSTS OF CONTESTS OVER NUISANCE PROPOSALS. C) SHAREHOLDERS WILL MAKE THE WRONG DECISIONS. D) OPPORTUNISTIC PROPOSALS. E) DISRUPTIVE CYCLES. F) PANGLOSSIAN CLAIMS. G) COMPARISON TO POLITICAL REFERENDA. 5. GAME-ENDING, SCALING-DAWN, AND OTHER SPECIFIC BUSINESS DECISIONS. A) LEAVING SHAREHOLDERS THE CHOICE WHETHER TO HAVE A CHOICE. B) GAME-ENDING DECISIONS. C) SCALING-DOWN DECISIONS. 6. MANAGEMENT INSULATION AND STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS. A) THE PUZZLING SCOPE OF THE STAKE HOLDER INTERESTS CLAIM. B) DO WEAK SHAREHOLDERS BENEFIT STAKEHOLDERS? C) MANAGEMENT PROTECTION IN SHAKEHOLDER CLOTHES. 7. CONCLUSION.

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