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Centro de Estudios Municipales y de Cooperación Internacional (CEMCI)

RECOVERING THE COSTS OF PUBLIC NUISANCE ABATEMENT: THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CITY SUE THE GUN INDUSTRY

Harvard Law Review, n.º 6/2000, pág. 1521

Sumario
1. Theories of recovery: The framework. 2. Recoveryas a property owner. 3. Suits by the public city. 4.Conclusion.

REJOINDER: THE WAR ON TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, CLEAR STATEMENT REQUIREMENTS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

BRADLEY, CURTIS A.; GOLDSMITH, JACK L.

Harvard Law Review, n.º 8/2005, pág. 2683

Sumario
I. THE AUMF AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR. II. CLEAR STATEMENT REQUIREMENT. III. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN. IV. CONCLUSION.

REPLY TO CRITICS OF THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY.

POSNER, RICHARD A.

Harvard Law Review, n.º 7/1998, pág. 1796

Sumario
1. Ronald Dworkin. 2. Charles Fried. 3. Anthony Kronman. 4. John Noonan. 5. Martha Nussbaum.

RESTRUCTURING THE MODERN TREATY POWER

Harvard Law Review, n.º 8/2001, pág. 2478

Sumario
1. The original understanding of the treaty power.a) The treaty power and the consolidation of nationalsovereignty. b) Treaties as contracts between sovereigns onmatters of "international concern". c) Exclusivity and thebinding nature of treaties. 2. The demise of the originalmeaning: the modern treaty power. a) Globalization and thecollapse of the international-domestic distinction. b) Thedecline of natural-law theories of international obligation.3. Restructuring the modern treaty power: a two-trackapproach. a) The justification for interchangeability. b)Globalization, federalism, and the modern treaty power. 4.Conclusion.

RETHINKING FISCAL FEDERALISM

SUPER, DAVID A.

Harvard Law Review, n.º 8/2005, pág. 2544

Sumario
INTRODUCTION. I. THE INABILITY OF STANDARD THEORIES OF FEDERALISM TO EXPLAIN FEDERAL-STATE FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS. II. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN STATES' FISCAL AFFAIRS. III. STATE BUDGETS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE. IV. SUBSTANTIVE BIAS IN STATE BUDGET PROCEDURES. V. TOWARD A NEW FISCAL FEDERALISM. CONCLUSION.

RETHINKING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE DEBATE: THE FRAMERS, FEDERALISM, AND ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE

Harvard Law Review, n.º 8/2001, pág. 2526

Sumario
1. The Framers' rationales for the electoralcollege. a) Three compromises. b) Assessing the viability ofthe Framers' rationales. 2. Large states, small states, andthe Framers' vision. a) Introduction to the small-state andlarge-state biases. b) Measuring the large-state bias: thewinner-take-all bias. c) Measuring the small-state bias: theSenate add-on bias. d) The difficulty of normativejustification. 3. Re-evaluating the electoral college. a)Other rationales for the electoral college. b) Theone-person, one-vote problem. 4. Conclusion.

RETHINKING THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL AGENCY LAWYERS

Harvard Law Review, n.º 4/2002, pág. 1170

Sumario
I. Conventional approaches to government lawyers' responsibilities. II. The role of the federal agency lawyer. III. The critical model. IV. Conclusion.

RETROACTIVITY AND LEGAL CHANGE: AN EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH

FISCH, JILL E.

Harvard Law Review, n.º 5/1997, pág. 1055

RIGHTS, RULES, AND THE STRUCTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FALLON

ADLER, MATTHEW D.

Harvard Law Review, n.º 6/2000, pág. 1371

Sumario
1. The rule-dependence of constitutional doctrine.2. Two rule-dependent models of constitutional adjudication:The Adler model and the Fallon model. 3. No help here: somefactors that do not favor Fallon. 4. Choosing between themodels.

SAFETY VALVE CLOSED: THE REMOVAL OF NONVIOLENT OUTLETS FOR DISSENT AND THE ONSET OF ANTI-ABORTION VIOLENCE

Harvard Law Review, n.º 5/2000, pág. 1210

Sumario
1. An overview of abortion opposition tacticsbefore and after Roe v. Wade. 2. The repression ofnonviolent avenues of dissent and the onset violence. 3.Conclusion.

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