Centro de Estudios Municipales y de Cooperación Internacional (CEMCI)

Tu privacidad es importante para nosotros.

Utilizamos cookies propias y de terceros para fines analíticos. La base de tratamiento es el consentimiento, salvo en el caso de las cookies imprescindibles para el correcto funcionamiento del sitio web. Puedes obtener más información en nuestra Política de Cookies.

¿Qué estás buscando?

Centro de Estudios Municipales y de Cooperación Internacional (CEMCI)

SHIFTING THE BURDEN: HOW MUCH CAN GOVERNMENT DOWNLOAD TO THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR?

HALL, MICHAEL H.;REED, PAUL B.

Canadian Public Administration, n.º 1/1998, pág. 1

Sumario
1. Factors in assessing the prospects for downloading. a) The size and composition of the non-profit sector in Canada. b) The character of non-profit sector. c) Differences between government and nonprofit organizations. d) Additional considerations. 2. Theoretical perspectives on the role of non-profits in the delivery of social programs. 3. Implications of government downloading of social services. a) Terminationg programs while maintaining non-profit funding.

SHORTER MEASURES: THE CHANGING MINISTERIAL CAREER IN CANADA

WHITE, GRAHAM;SEVILLA, GLADYS

Canadian Public Administration, n.º 3/1998, pág. 369

Sumario
1. Context of changes in ministerial careers. 2. Pre-cabinet legislative experience. 3. Age. 4. Tenure in office. 5. Tenure in individual portfolios. 6. Range of ministerial experience. 7. Leaving cabinet. 8. Conclusion.

SOLID-WASTE CONTRACTING-OUT, COMPETITION, AND BIDDING PRACTICES AMONG CANADIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

MCDAVID, J.C.

Canadian Public Administration, n.º 1/2001, pág. 1

Sumario
1. Hypotheses and existing research. 2. The study.3. Findings. 4. Conclusions.

STRENGTHENING THE TIES THAT BIND? AN ANALYSIS OF ABORIGINAL- MUNICIPAL INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

NELLES, JEN; ALCANTARA, CHRISTOPHER

Canadian Public Administration, n.º 3/2011, pág. 315 a 334

Sumario
1. Background considerations. 2. Types of partnerships. 3. Evaluating the intensity of First Nations-local/regional relationships. 4. Results and observations. 5. Conclusion.

TENSIONS ENTRE RATIONALITÉ TECHNIQUE ET INTÉRÊTS POLITIQUES: L'EXEMPLE DE LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA LOI SUR LES AGENCES DE DÉVELOPPEMENT DE RÉSEAUX LOCAUX DE SERVICES DE SANTÉ ET DE SERVICES SOCIAUX AU QUÉBEC

CONTANDRIOPOULOS, D.; HUDON, R.; MARTIN, E.; THOMPSON, D.

Canadian Public Administration, n.º 2/2007, pág. 219 a 243

Sumario
1. MISE EN CONTEXTE: LA LOI 25. 2. DONNÉES ET CADRE CONCEPTUEL. 3. MODÈLE COMMUNICATIONNEL. 4. CANAUX ET ACTEURS DE LA COMMUNICATION. 5. PRÉSENTATION DES CAS. 6. DISCUSSION. 7. NATURE ET STATUT DES ACTEURS. 8. CONTENU ET FORME DES COMMUNICATIONS. 9. PRAGMATISME ET SENSIBILITÉ POLITIQUE. 10. CONCLUSION.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MUNICIPAL COOPERATION ON CANADIAN CITIES AND TOWNS: AN ASSESSMENT

HEWITT, W.E.

Canadian Public Administration, n.º 3/1999, pág. 312

Sumario
1. International municipal cooperation as anemergent phenomenon. 2. IMC: The Canadian context. 3. Thecase studies. 4. Conclusion.

THE ANDERSEN-COMSOC AFFAIR; PARTNERSHIPS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

WHORLEY, DAVID

Canadian Public Administration, n.º 3/2001, pág. 320

Sumario
1. Public-private partnerships. 2. Comsoc'sbusiness transformation project. 3. Analysis. 4. Publicadministration redux. 5. Conclusion.

THE CANADIAN PUBLIC SERVICE HAS A PERSONALITY

SAVOIE, D.J.

Canadian Public Administration, n.º 3/2006, pág. 261 a 281

Sumario
1. THE CONSTITUTION. 2. CHALLENGING THE DOCTRINE. 3. IN SEARCH OF A PERSONALITY. 4. THE CONSEQUENCES.

THE CASE FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN INFRASTRUCTURE

MURPHY, T.J.

Canadian Public Administration, n.º 1/2008, pág. 99 a 126

Sumario
I. The public policy rationale for P3 arrangements. 1. "Off-book" financing -a declining factor. 2. Accelerating construction. 3. Shifting risk to the private sector. 4. Cost-savings. 5. Customer service improvements. 6. Enabling the public sector to focus on outcomes and core business. II. Responding to the key arguments against P3s. 1. Higher cost, less value. 2. Lower-quality design and service. 3. Less accountability, more secrecy. 4. Threat to workers' rights. 5. Loss of public policy flexibility. III. Ensuring successful P3s. 1. The nature of the project. 2. Effective project and contract management skills. 3. Reduced uncertainty and effective risk allocation. IV. Conclusion.

THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT: PAUL MARTIN AND PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

PETER AUCOIN, LORI TURNBULL

Canadian Public Administration, n.º 4/2003, pág. 427 a 449

Sumario
I.PARLIAMENTARY REFORM: MARTIN'S SIX-POINT PLAN. II.THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT:WHY PARLIAMENTARY REFORM?. III.THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND THE POPULIST CHALLENGE. IV.CONCLUSION.

Página 13 de 16