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Centro de Estudios Municipales y de Cooperación Internacional (CEMCI)

POSITIVE RIGHTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL RATIONALITY REVIEW

HERSHKOFF, HELEN

Harvard Law Review, n.º 6/1999, pág. 1131

Sumario
1. State Constitutional Welfare Practice. 2. Reconsidering Federal Rationality Review in StateConstitutional Welfare Cases. 3. Toward a New Standard ofReview. 4. Conclusion.

POSNER'S PROBLEMATICS.

NOONAN, JR., JOHN T.

Harvard Law Review, n.º 7/1998, pág. 1768

POWERS OF CONGRESS AND THE COURT REGARDING THE AVAILABILITY AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

Harvard Law Review, n.º 5/2001, pág. 1551

Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. The "Whole Law" principle ondirect and Habeas Review. 3. Whether to Review. 4.Implications of the Williams result for Direct Review.

PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES: THE PROCESS/PRODUCT DISTINCTION AND THE REGULATION OF CONSUMER CHOICE.

KYSAR, DOUGLAS A.

Harvard Law Review, n.º 2/2004, pág. 525 a 642

Sumario
1. INTRODUCTION. 2. THE PROCESS/PRODUCT DISTINCTION. A) INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND "PRODUCTS AS SUCH". B) GENETIC ENGINEERING AND "SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE". C) COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND "MERE CONSUMER CONCERN". 3. THE REGULATION OF CONSUMER CHOICE. A) COMPREHENDING PREFERENCES FOR PROCESSES. B) PROCESS PREFERENCES IN GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY. 4. CONCLUSION.

PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION

KAGAN, ELENA

Harvard Law Review, n.º 8/2001, pág. 2245

Sumario
1. Non-presidential mechanisms of administrativecontrol. a) Congressional Control. b) Self-control. c)Interest group control. d) Judicial control. 2. Presidentialadministration- some background and history. a) Earlyefforts. b) The Reagan era. c) A postscript. 3. PresidentialAdministration in the Clinton years. a) Two examples. b)Techniques: review, directives, and appropriation. c) Scopeand Limits. d) Causes and Responses. e) Comparisons and aprediction. 4. Assessing presidential administration. a)Constitutional questions. b) The case for presidentialadministration. c) Objections and limitations. 5. Enhancingpresidential administration through legal rules. a) TheNondelegation Doctrine. b) Judicial review. 6. Conclusion.

PRINCIPLES, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

SCHAUER, FREDERICK

Harvard Law Review, n.º 1/1998, pág. 84

Sumario
1. Forbes and the state as journalist. 2. Finley and the state as patron. 3. The false paths. a) Forums, public and otherwise. b) The state as speaker. c) Unconstitutional conditions. d) Viewpoint discrimination. 4. Institutional autonomy and the legal point of view. 5. Free speech and institutional autonomy. 6. Conclusion.

PRIVACY, PHOTOGRAPHY, AND THE PRESS.

D. WARREN, SAMUEL;D. BRANDEIS, LOUIS

Harvard Law Review, n.º 4/1998, pág. 1086

Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. The protection of privacy under existing law. 3. The vulnerability of photography under existing law. 4. The inherently expressive nature of photography. 5. The societal interest in protecting photography. a) The importance of free speech and a free press to democracy. b) The importance of protecting photography.

PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE CALIFORNIA ANTI-PAPARAZZI STATUTE

Harvard Law Review, n.º 6/1999, pág. 1367

Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. Privacy and the common law. 3. Repairing a broken law: is more law the answer?. 4.successful attempt to improve privacy protections?. 5.Conclusion.

PRIVATIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY

TREBILOCK, MICHAEL J.; IACOBUCCI, EDWARD M.

Harvard Law Review, n.º 5/2003, pág. 1422 a 1453

Sumario
1. INTRODUCTION 2. WHY PRIVATE FIRMS DO BETTER THAN THE STATE IN PURSUING PROFIT 3. SOCIAL WELFARE AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 4. DOES THE COST OF MARKET FAILURES EXCEED THE COST OF GOVERNMENT FAILURES? 5. DEFINING THE APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT 6. ACCOUNTABILITY 7. CONCLUSION

PROPERTY RULES VERSUS LIABILITY RULES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

KAPLOW, LOUIS;SHAVELL STEVEN

Harvard Law Review, n.º 4/1996, pág. 713

Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. Harmful Externalities. a) Parties do not bargain with each other. b) Parties bargain with each other. c) Victims' Behavoir. d) Additional Considerations. e) Examples. 3. The taking of things. a) Parties do not bargain with each other. b) Parties bargain with each other. c) A fundamental problem with ....

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