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Centro de Estudios Municipales y de Cooperación Internacional (CEMCI)

TOWARD FEDERAL DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN: AN EXAMINATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

AGRANOFF, ROBERT;RAMOS GALLARIN, JUAN ANTONIO

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, n.º 4/1997, pág. 1

Sumario
1. Institutional arrangements. 2. Building of self-rule and shared rule. 3. Intergovernmental fiscal patterns. 4. Intergovernmental services production and provision. 5. Intergovernmental politics. 6. Conclusion.

TREATY FEDERALISM IN NORTHERN CANADA: ABORIGINAL-GOVERNMENT LAND CLAIMS BOARDS

WHITE, GRAHAM

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, n.º 3/2002, pág. 89 a 114

Sumario
SUMMARY: 1. TREATY FEDERALISM 2. TREATY FEDERALSIM THROUGH CLAIMS BOARDS 3.TERRITORIES AND CLAIMS BOARDS: AN OVERVIEW 4. CLAIMS BOARDS AS UNIQUE INISTITUTIONS 5. THE INDEPENDENCE OF CLAIMS BOARDS 6. ABORIGINAL PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING 7. CLAIMS BOARDS AND ABORIGINAL CULTURE 8. CONCLUSION

URBAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE FLYPAPER EFFECT: EVIDENCE FROM MAHARASHTRA, INDIA

KARNIK, AJIT; LALVANI, MALA

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, n.º 2/2005, pág. 273

Sumario
1. THE FLYPAPER EFFECT. 2. URBAN LOCAL BODIES IN MAHARASHTRA. 3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY. 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS I. 5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS II. 6. DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS. 7. CONCLUSION.

WEALTH-TRANSFER TAXES IN U.S. FISCAL FEDERALISM: A LEVY STILL IN NEED OF REFORM

ARONSON, J.RICHARD;MUNLEY, VINCENT G.

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, n.º 3/2001, pág. 151

Sumario
1. Legal and economic justification of wealth-transfer taxes. 2. Thumbnail history of federal and state taxation of wealth transfers. a) The tax base, rates, and credits. b) Revenues from estate, gift, and inheritance taxes. 3. State wealth-transfer taxes. 4. A proposal for reform and coordination of estate, inheritance, and gift taxes. 5. Conclusion.

WEALTH, POWER, AND ATTORNEY REGULATION IN THE U.S. STATES: LICENSE ENTRY AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS

HOWARD, ROBERT M.

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, n.º 4/1998, pág. 21

Sumario
1. Theoretical foundations. 2. Hypotheses. 3. Dataand methods. 4. Conclusion.

WELFARE REFORM: REVOLUTION OR RETRENCHMENT?

BEER, SAMUEL H.

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, n.º 3/1998, pág. 9

WHAT ROLE DOES THE "FEDERALISM BONUS" PLAY IN PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION?

ADKINS, RANDALL E.; KIRWAN, KENT A.

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, n.º 4/2002, pág. 71 a 90

Sumario
I. THE FEDERAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. II. THREE CRITICAL CASES. III. THE "FEDERALISM BONUS" AND THE PROSPECTS FOR REFORM. IV. CONCLUSION.

WHO PREEMPTED THE MASSACHUSETTS BURMA LAW? FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER GLOBAL TRADE RULES

STUMBERG, ROBERT;PORTERFIELD, MATTHEW C.

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, n.º 3/2001, pág. 173

Sumario
1. History B.C.: before Crosby. a) Market participation in foreign affairs. b) Federal Burma sanctions. c) Global trade rules. d) Accountability as a principle of federalism. 2. Litigation in two hemispheres. a) WTO complaint. b) NFTC complaint and Lower Court decisions. c) Supreme Court decision. 3. Political accountability and federalism. a) Obstacle preemtion. b) Limited federal sanctions. c) Lack of political will to preempt. d) Principles of federalism. e) Sovereignty protection under trade rules. f) Avoidance of exclusive federal power claims. 4. Conclusion.

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