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A NOTE ON INTERREGIONAL VERSUS INTRAREGIONAL INEQUALITY

RIETVELD, P.

Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 4/1991, pág. 627

1. Introduction. 2. Interregional versusìintraregional variance: A statistical formulation. 3.ìInequality of binary variables. 4. The upper bound ofìinterregional variance. 5. The inequality of lifetimeìvariables. 6. Empirical results. 7. Concluding remarks.

A SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS MODEL OF ZONING AND LAND VALUES

MCMILLEN, D.P.;MACDONALD, J.F.

Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 1/1991, pág. 55

Sumario

1. Introduction. 2. The data. 3. The empiricalìmodel. 4. Estimation results. 5. Conclusion.

ANALYZING URBAN DECENTRALIZATION: THE CASE OF HOUSTON

MIESZKOWSKI, P.;SMITH, B.

Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 2/1991, pág. 183

Sumario

1. Introduction. 2. Models of urban structure. 3. Density gradients and the decentralization of Houston. 4.ìDiscussion of Houston's development pattern. 5. Concludingìremarks.

ARE REAL HOUSE PRICES LIKELY TO DECLINE BY 47 PERCENT?

HENDERSHOTT, P.H.

Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 4/1991, pág. 553

Sumario

1. Introduction. 2. The Mankiw-Weil model. 3. Theìbasic Mankiw-Weil empirical result. 4. An in-sampleìforecast. 5. An expanded model. 6. References.

AVERAGE REVENUE REGULATION AND REGIONAL PRICE STRUCTURE

BRADLEY, L.;PRICE, C.

Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 1/1991, pág. 89

Sumario

1. Introduction. 2. Markets with identical demandìbut different costs. 3. Similar costs, different demands. 4.ìDifferent costs, different demands. 5. Regulation in theìU.K.. 6. Conclusion.

COMPETITIVE JURISDICTIONS, CONGESTION, AND THE HENRY GEORGE THEOREM: WHEN SHOULD PROPERTY BE TAXED INSTEAD OF LAND?

HOYT, W.H.

Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 3/1991, pág. 351

Sumario

1. Introduction. 2. Properti taxation withìcompetitive jurisdictions. 3. Jurisdictions with marketìpower. 4. Concluding remarks. 5. Appendix A. Equilibriumìconditions and derivations of price changes. 6. Appendix B.ìComparative static results of changes in market share.

DEBT IN A MODEL OF TAX COMPETITION

JENSEN, R.;TOMA, E.F.

Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 3/1991, pág. 371

Sumario

1. Introduction. 2. The basic model. 3. Subgameìperfect equilibrium behavior. 4. A numerical example. 5.ìConcluding comments

ECONOMISTS' PREJUDICES: WHY THE MANKIW-WEIL STORY IS NOT CREDIBLE

WOODWARD, S.E.

Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 4/1991, pág. 531

Sumario

1. Introduction. 2. The long-run supply of housingìis fairly elastic. 3. Markets, including housing markets,ìare efficient. 4. Serial correlation, or the number areìfunny. 5. Reflections.

FISCAL POLICY WITH MULTILEVEL GOVERNMENTS

POSSEN, U.M.;SLUTSKY, S.M.

Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 1/1991, pág. 1

Sumario

1. Introduction. 2. The model. 3. Non-neutralityìof offsetting changes. 4. General comparative staticsìresults. 5. Conclusion. 6. Apendix A. 7. Apendix B.

HETEROGENEITY OF LABOR MARKETS AND CITY SIZE IN AN OPEN SPATIAL ECONOMY

KIM, S.

Regional Science and Urban Economics, n.º 1/1991, pág. 109

Sumario

1. Introduction. 2. The model. a) Workers. b)ìFirms and urban technology. c) Working of the model. 3.ìLabor market equilibrium. a) Wage determination. b)ìSymmetric zero-profit condition. 4. Land market equilibrium.ì5. Determination of city size and comparative statics. 6.ìConclusions and further extensions.

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